Critique of "Pierre Bezukhov by Leo Tolstoy"

Critique of "Pierre Bezukhov by Leo Tolstoy"

To put it in my own words, Gallic, Gallo, and Novak are arguing three things: first, that Leo Tolstoy intended to write a book centered on his concepts of ethics and the philosophy of history. Second, that these ideas are embodied by a central character whom they argue is none other than Pierre Bezukhov based on his embodiment of the themes of the text, his role in advancing the action of the story, and his prevalence within the novel. And third, that Pierre is also the embodiment of Tolstoy himself within the novel.

Now, from the beginning one of these goals is in error. To suggest that Pierre can be equated with Tolstoy is an argument that can never be absolutely confirmed. It would be better to say that Pierre embodies some of Tolstoy's own ideas, but even then, how can anyone determine where the fictional character ends and the real man begins?

As for the point that Pierre embodies the central theme of the text, there seems to be in confusion about what this theme is. Our authors explicitly write that the theme is "Pierre's search for meaning in life," yet the essay focuses more on his quest for spiritual fulfillment and for happiness than for meaning in life. Which is the real central theme of the text? If the answer is all three, then that is what should have been explicitly stated.

And finally, the essay concludes with points that have completely departed from the introduction and thesis of the paper. While I was impressed with the idea that Tolstoy's intention is to write about his ethical and historical philosophies, which I think may be true, in the beginning of the paper it says that Pierre embodies these ideas and is therefore the central character of the text. Yet, the conclusion says:

Thus the only character in War and Peace that can justifiably be called the main character is Pierre. Pierre is a balance between Andrew's reason and Natasha's passion, using both as a guide to his actions. As the novel progresses, he learns how to use each of the traits at the appropriate moment. Pierre makes many mistakes over the course of the book, but he learns from them and eventually experiences a change within himself and uses this new realization to bring change to Natasha and other characters in the novel. Tolstoy presents Pierre’s struggle and movement toward faith as redemptive and positive. For these reasons, Pierre Bezukhov, and not War and Peace, is the more adequate title for Tolstoy’s novel.

I don't at all see the connection between the original points and the concluding ones. The essay never completes its original argument and instead finishes with an off-topic conclusion.

Sincerely,

F. R. Leavis

Critique of "The Army is Soldiers"

Critique of "The Army is Soldiers"

There are several problems with renaming Tolstoy's masterpiece “The Army is Soldiers.” First, this title suggests an entirely military plot. While the military is an important part, much of the action of this novel takes place in Russian drawing rooms and is centered around intrigue in Russian high society. Also, this title seems to place a stress on the individuality of people (or the army), rather than their communality, and seems to backfire if its chosen purpose was to stress Tolstoy's focus on community. Furthermore, it seems to lack any spiritual aspect, which is a central motif of the book, especially in Pierre's struggle to discover meaning in life. Finally, “The Army is Soldiers” is an aurally awkward sounding title which detracts from Tolstoy's beautifully written prose.

Individualism

Individualism

My question was similar to Alyssa's. Throughout the entire text, Kierkegaard emphasizes the direct, personal experience between the individual and the divine teacher. Ultimately, this raises the question of how the community of believers would fit into Kierkegaard's system. How would Kierkegaard view communal religion and Tradition?

Jesus and History

Jesus and History

My questions are similar to those of Tara and Alyssa. While to some degree I understand Kierkegaard's argument for Jesus's contemporaries being at a disadvantage, I am not sure if it is entirely plausible. Jesus did indeed reveal his divine nature (the Resurrection), so why would his contemporaries be at a disadvantage if he revealed his divine nature to them? Also I wonder how important the historical Jesus, and history in general is to Kierkegaard. Is what we claim to know (from the Bible) about the historical Jesus important? Or is it simply the moral message that is important (i.e. Spinoza)?

Freeeeedom

Freeeeedom

"The future has not yet happened. But it is on that account less necessary than the past, since the past did not become necessary by coming into existence, but on the contrary proved by coming into existence that it was not necessary." (I don't have page numbers)

Can we discuss Kierkegaard's use of the words "Freedom" and "Necessity"? Why would the past's coming into existence prove its non-necessity?

J.C. as a nota bene

J.C. as a nota bene

Kierkegaard states:

Even if the contemporary generation had not left anything behind except these words, "We have believed that in such and such a year the god appeared in the humble form of a servant, lived and taught among us, and then died"--this is more than enough. The contemporary generation would have done what is needful, for this little announcement, this world-historical nota bene, is enough to become an occasion for someone who comes later, and the most prolix report can never in all eternity become more for the person who comes later (104)

I realize that Kierkegaard wants to emphasize each person's direct experience with God as teacher, i.e. the moment, but do we agree that if all that was left behind about Jesus Christ was a line or two, our faith-life would be the same as it is today? What would Kierkegaard say is the role of the Bible? What would he determine about the centuries of Catholic Tradition that are supposed to be so important?

The Paradox is So Paradoxical, Even Believing in the Paradox is Paradoxical

The Paradox is So Paradoxical, Even Believing in the Paradox is Paradoxical

But then is faith just as paradoxical as the paradox? Quite so. How else could it have its object in the paradox and be happy in relation to it? Faith itself is a wonder, and everything that is true of the paradox is also true of faith. (65)

It was tough enough when the paradox was just members-only; now, even the state of qualifying for the condition is paradoxical too. Can we flesh out the way in which faith is a miracle a little more? What does this mean for his concept of condition? Are we satisfied with the non-universality of the condition?

Peter, Paul...and Tara?

Peter, Paul...and Tara?

I'm not sure that I completely agree with Kierkegaard's argument for contemporaries of the God being on the same playing field as those of us who come after. I'm not sure how someone with direct knowledge, and direct observation of God's actions can be said to have equal interaction with God as someone who comes 2,000 years later. I think a chat with the incarnate God makes one a little bit closer than reading the testimony of an apostle 2,000 years after the fact. Do we all buy his reasoning on this topic?

The Elusive First Nature

The Elusive First Nature

"Now faith certainly may become a person's second nature, but a person for whom it becomes second nature must certainly have had a first nature, inasmuch as faith became the second. If that fact is to be naturalized, then with respect to the individual it may be said that the individual is born with faith--that is, with his second nature" (96).

In the passage above, Kierkegaard says that faith is our second nature, and therefore states that we must also have a first nature. If faith is our second nature, then what exactly would our first nature be? Would it be a sort of original, blank slate, perhaps including the condition for faith, that exists prior to one obtains faith through a situation such as the moment? It seems that the first nature would necessarily exclude faith, but of what exactly does Kierkegaard believe that it consists?

Do Christians need to be poets?

Do Christians need to be poets?

Why is this text so beautifully written?  Caitlin asks a similar question in her post, and Tim brings up that Kierkegaard is as Christian as can be without actually using Christian language.  Is it Kierkegaard's rewriting Christian doctrine/dogma/faith to recover its beauty or to infuse it with a beauty it never had before?  

The God Illusion

The God Illusion

Kierkegaard seems to be creating a philosophy that justifies Christianity without explicitly using Christian language. Why do you think he is doing this? And does this have any connection to his claims at the end of most chapters that he knows his philosophy is nothing new?

The God Illusion

The God Illusion

(Dis)Satisfaction

(Dis)Satisfaction

Is it simply my human nature that makes me dissatisfied with Kierkegaard's explanation of the limit of our understanding, of the paradox of the unknown? I get it, we want what we can't have, and it's a self-perpetuating cycle, whatever. His account makes attempts to rationally prove God's existence not only foredoomed, but asinine. "You can't get there rationally, deal with it and either jump (leap of faith) or don't," basically doesn't do it for me. And this makes me even angrier because my dissatisfaction seems to almost prove his point. Am I just stuck in the Soren's cycle? Or can I put my reason to good use and get past this limit Kierkegaard imposed, if that's the correct term... I'm not sure my qualms can be settled in class, I just thought I'd voice my frustration.

"But the ultimate potentiation of every passion is always to will its own fall, and so it is also the ultimate passion of the understanding to will the collision, although in one way or another the collision must become its downfall. This, then is the ultimate paradox of thought: to want to discover something that thought itself cannot think."

Although there is much more to be taken from Soren, I felt as though this quote was the most thought provoking. Being a student who loves to think I found it striking the way he phrases the ultimate paradox of life: "To want to discover something that thought itself cannot think." To want to discover something that is so beyond us, that is so intangible, that is so perfect, that our little human minds could never wrap our heads around. This quote made me think of St. Anslem's famous saying that God is "that which nothing greater can be thought." Our passion and our will is to find out the unthinkable. Our desire is to know what is impossible to know? Where does this curiosity come from? The believe in God is something that theologians have taught us is beyond our comprehension. The ultimate paradox of thought is to want to know what is impossible to know... Why? What other ways to we ask questions that seem to have no answer? How do questions like these lead to bigger answers?

Caitlin's question (through Prof)

Caitlin's question (through Prof)

Caitlin Kelly

Blog Post

11 October 2009

The Appendix is subtitled “Offense at the Paradox (An Acoustical Illusion)”, and in it, Kierkegaard elaborates on the term offense and criticizes those men who believe that they can understand the paradox (Kierkegaard explains that this is in itself paradoxical…and yet, it is also exactly what we will try and do as a class on Monday…). In the Appendix, Kierkegaard explains, “So it is with offense. Everything it says about the paradox it has learned from the paradox, even though, making use of the acoustical illusion, it insists that it itself has originated the paradox” (53).

I am interested in the use of the term acoustical illusion. What specifically does Kierkegaard mean when he says misled men make use of the acoustical illusion? There is a much clearer way of expressing this same point, so why does the author choose lyrical phrasing? How does this relate to our conversation on Wednesday about Kierkegaard’s role as a poet?

Grace and Sin in Kierkegaard

Grace and Sin in Kierkegaard

In Kierkegaard's third section of Philosophical Fragments, he talks about the ultimate metaphysical paradox: that Jesus can be both fully human and fully divine. It seems to me that offense at this paradox is what stops people, especially non-Christians, from understanding God. Kierkegaard suggests that the only way to get past this paradox is through a leap of faith (the leap) (p. 43). But he also suggests that we can only take this leap if we have passion (grace??)(p. 48). Finally, he suggests those who are unable to take the leap because sin is the action of willing their own downfalls and pushing them further into ignorance (p. 47). Is this how the process works? If so, how do we get this passion (grace)? Clearly by attempting to understand God through philosophy and strongly desiring knowledge will lead us to ignorance. How then should we behave when confronted with this offensive paradox?

Why so sad? (QUESTION FOR EMILY)

I am puzzled by Kierkegaard's proposition that the love of God is a sorrowful love. In the metaphor with the King and the maiden the love is sorrowful because the King shadows the maiden and he feel sorry for her. However, wouldn't the maiden be made the King's equal and become a Queen who shares all of his riches and power? Couldn't God elevate the learned person to a place nearer to his status? (Like the deification we've talked about with Mongrain?) It seems strange to me that God would ever be sad, especially after someone has determined the Truth.

Also Kierkegaard writes: "The poet's task will be to find a solution, some point of union, where love's understanding may be realized in truth, the God's anxiety set at rest, his sorrow banished" (still don't have page numbers, sorry!). Why does this responsibility fall to the poet rather than the philosopher? What is the importance of poetry in the search for Truth? And why does Kierkegaard refer to his work as a poem when it seems to in fact be prose? Is it just the translation that distorts its poeticism?

The Moment

The Moment

And, now, the moment. A moment such as this is unique. To be sure, it is short and temporal, as the moment is; it is passing , as the moment is, past, as the moment is in the next moment, and yet it is decisive, and yet it is filled with the eternal. A moment such as this must have a special name. Let us call it: the fullness of time.

What does Kierkegaard mean when the moment is equivalent to the fullness of time? Does this speak for the moment's depth and significance, or is he interested in the paradox of the terms by definition?

Stuck in a Moment

Stuck in a Moment

I'm a little confused about the role of "the moment". Kierkegaard says that the moment must have "decisive significance" in order to move from the Socratic standpoint, however I'm not sure I understand how this is accomplished.

I know it has something to do with the fact that in the Socratic understanding of knowledge, there is no decisive moment at which one learns something, because we are only recalling, but I don't think this is all that there is to the story. I know this is a very technical question, but it is really hampering my ability to understand the rest of the reading.

Method, Style, and Purpose

Method, Style, and Purpose

We've really run the gamut this Seminar in terms of genre. We had the novel (and more) with War & Peace, poetry with Lao Tzu, epic poetry with the Gita, fragments with Buddha, and dense nonfiction with Hegel. Finally, we have in Kierkegaard the old PLS staple of enjoyable nonfiction.

In the first chapter, Kierkegaard coaxes Christianity out of Socrates, somehow. He really does coax it: cf. pg. 16, when we get the first example of this method of his. He describes something-- untruth-- and slowly brings it around to something of which he can say: "Let us call it sin." He uses this same methodology with words like "deliverer," "savior," "procreative." He is no hurry (cf. p. 20); the points he wants to make emerge from his arguments gently.

His use of the word "poetry" is interesting to describe what he is doing here. He uses stories, e.g. the child's toy, the knight (p. 16), and of course the King (p. 27). To deal with this discrepancy I was reminded of Plato's rejection of meter and his subsequent rendering of the first part of the Iliad (in the Republic). Kierkegaard might be unclear at times, but he never fails to be frank: he provides stories, dialogue, simile, and in general a calm tone to communicate his purpose. If it's poetry, it's not false poetry (cf. p. 34, middle paragraph).

What can we take from Kierkegaard's tone and use of literary devices? Specifically, how do these resonate with the content of what he's saying? With the purpose he lays out for himself?