Utopian Rationality
In Modern Times, Hegel again discusses freedom. He discusses various examples of hinderance to a people's freedom, and then in concurrence with his introduction concludes that freedom is established through rationality. In a political system, he points to the aristocracy as the link between the Sovereign and the People, providing Rationality in its most Universal form. Is this merely wishful thinking? Can a system rely on a class of people, especially one that is not exactly the middle of the road, empathizing with everyone else, to provide universal, common-good rationality?Chapters of History
Hegel divides "The Modern Time" into three chapters of history. He begins the modern time with the Reformation, then moves on to the influence of the Reformation on political development, and finally talks about the Eclaircissement and Revolution. It seems that his concept of modernity thus revolves around the Reformation. Are we in agreement on this? What is the importance of approaching the philosophy of history from this perspective?Spiritual State vs. Secular State
How can the realization of the Spirit be the justification of God in History if the Secular State is the better form of government?Does a teleological aim negate the purpose of history?
The "Progress" of History
While reading I had similar concerns to the other people who posted before me. Hegel contends that history unfolds according to the "'plan' of Providence." As Alyssa noted, there are many events in history which seem contradictory with a sense of Providence from an All-Good God. Why is it necessary for Hegel to believe that history is progressing positively. While many people would buy the notion that history unfolds according to God's plan, how would we explain the many apparent execeptions (war, genocide, disease, etc.)? If we do not buy Hegel's thesis of history, is this work worth reading at all?Improvement?
Hegel asserts that history can be seen to be moving towards the actualization of the World-Spirit attaining its object - finding itself and contemplating itself in concrete-actuality. (25) My issue is that I can't buy the idea that the world is progressing towards some ultimate ideal. Where is this improvement? How are we better off than those of times past? It seems that killing, greed, and total self absorption have become more prevalent than at any point in history. I'm a little concerned that if we are progressing towards the ultimate actualization of the World-Spirit, that it's something that doesn't look like anything I want to be a part of.The Great Man
A World-historical individual is not so unwise as to indulge a variety of wishes to divide his regards. He is devoted to the One Aim, regardless of all else. It is even possible that such men may treat other great, even sacred interests, inconsiderately; conduct which is indeed obnoxious to moral reprehension. But so mighty a form must trample down many an innocent flower-- crush to pieces many an object in its path (32).
I have a difficult time dealing with this idea of the great man. Hegel seems to be saying that the great man has some kind of innate instinct to act in great ways. If the one aim is the idea of freedom, and the idea of freedom is bound up in the nature of God's Will (20), is it God's Will to trample down innocent flowers? Perhaps I am confused with the definition of the "One Aim", but if I'm not, it seems that the problem of evil is creeping up into the discussion. Many would say that Hitler was a great man, but it seems hard to reconcile the execution of millions of people with Hitler's supposed devotion to the One Aim. I would find it hard to say that the Holocaust was in God's Will.
Does anyone else find the same problem?
The Validity of Philosophical and Teleological Histories - Thought Piece
“History in general is therefore the development of Spirit in Time, as Nature is the development of the Idea in Space” (72).“Spirit—consuming the envelope of its existence—does not merely pass into another envelope, nor rise rejuvenescent from the ashes of its previous form; it comes forth exalted, glorified, a purer spirit. It certainly makes war upon itself—consumes its own existence; but in this very destruction it works up that existence into a new form, and each successive phase becomes in its turn a material, working on which it exalts itself to a new grade” (73).
“We have already discussed the final aim of this progression. The principles of the successive phases of Spirit that animate the Nations in a necessitated gradation, are themselves only steps in the development of the one universal Spirit, which through them elevates and completes itself to a self-comprehending totality” (78).
In the Philosophy of History, Hegel addresses the theme of history and its interpretation. Hegel’s ideas regarding history contrast those of Tolstoy’s but before I contrast the two, we need to examine the questions that Hegel’s writings elicit, namely the validity of philosophical and teleological histories.
Hegel’s thoughts ultimately raise the question regarding the definition of history. Often, the term history is understood so loosely that we fail to grasp how history is created. For many, history is the recounting of past events related to you by an authoritative textbook. Obviously, though, history has to be compiled and gathered. In his text, Hegel makes the distinction between the three types of history: original, reflective, and philosophic. Original history is written by actual observers who “simply transferred what was passing in the world around them” (1). Reflective history is authored by historians who are writing about the past. Finally, Hegel believes philosophical history is the highest. Hegel believes that a rational, philosophic mode can be used for historical interpretation to find that history is grounded in a Universal History with a spirit of Freedom. This Universal History is inherently rational, and by the use of reason, one can see that human societies, which are the expression of human reason, are moving towards states that more perfectly embody Freedom and the ideal of Universal History (16-17). As referenced in the three quotations on which I have based my thought piece, Hegel believes that history progresses along a timeline and that through antitheses, the ideal Universal History unfolds in our space and time towards perfection (77-78).
Hegel’s assertion, however, raises the following question: is his philosophic history valid and is it unnecessarily teleological? In the modern world, we recognize both scientific and rhetorical histories. Scientific histories work from empirical investigation of evidence and primary texts in an attempt to create an objective account of history. Pure objectivity is impossible, but the scientific method strives to be as close to objectivity as possible. Rhetorical history is an interpretive account. It is written for an audience with that culture’s views, beliefs, and sentiments in mind. Essentially it is a Nietzschean view of history. I have no doubt that Hegel pored carefully over his historical studies, but his assertion that societies and history itself is teleological and that states become more perfect seems untenable. Doesn’t a good historian avoid feeding interpretive, preconceived notions into the text? This significantly contrasts with Tolstoy’s view of history. Tolstoy viewed history as cold, aloof, and remote. History is the aggregate of all human actions, and it barrels along out of our own control. Those who attempt to control it, like Napoleon and other heroes, become enslaved and ultimately are deluded. History is unintelligible. For Hegel, however, history is completely knowable because it is inherently rational and follows rational, teleological principles. In fact, Hegel believes that great men affect historical events because they are in tune with the Universal Spirit, and this history has a teleological purpose. Instead of writing a philosophical history, has Hegel written a mythology instead?
498 Words Excluding Internal Citations
Passions?
....we may affirm absolutely that nothing great in the World has been accomplished without passion.
--23
The History of the World is not the theatre of happiness. Periods of happiness are blank pages in it, for they are periods of harmony - periods when the antithesis is in abeyance.
--26-7
Hegel corrects the meaning of the word passion on p. 23-4 to mean not individual self-interest but rather a "particular bent of character" interested in helping the community at large (24). Does this mean that his criticism of passion and subsequent lament (20-21) does not apply? What implications does all this (the second quote, and Matt's TP) have for happiness and the individual? What do passions have to do with the actualization of the soul or of the general will (cf. 38)?
Superfluous Thought Piece: A Real Left Turn(?)
In Hegel’s The Philosophy of History, we find a completely different attitude towards individuality from what we have recently encountered in the Eastern classics. There is a similar base line to the Eastern works, however almost immediately Hegel steers in the opposite direction.
On page 17 of the introduction, Hegel reveals that the “essence of Spirit is Freedom,” and Spirit and Freedom become his topics for the first half of the introduction. He continues, and explains that Spirit is self-contained existence–self-consciousness. This evokes the emphasis on the individual that was so prominent in the Eastern works, although for the East it was not an indulgence of the individual but rather a disconnect from everything not the individual, including passions, etc. He discounts this similarity, however, when on 18 he asserts, “The Orientals have not attained the knowledge that Spirit–Man as such–is free; and because they do not know this they are not free.” From there, the similarities cease and the disparities increase as Hegel takes his individuality in a completely new direction in terms of the course readings.
On 20, Hegel discusses the means of Freedom’s development, contending that action is the drive. Action is produced by the things that the Eastern philosophies strove to deny: passions and desires. This selfish action is the groundwork for all action, betterment, and eventually freedom, in dire contrast with the East, which only achieves freedom by denying passion and desire, thereby escaping the grasp of life and reincarnation, and reaching sublime nirvana in the soul through death.
Hegel propounds on 25 that when individual passions and actions come together in the naturally forming societies of humanity, they combine to create not private but social desires, such as Reason, Justice, and Liberty, all which hold much more weight than the individual claims. This union of individual passions forms the basis of the State, and likewise forms Law. He further insists that the State and Law are the only channels through which self-consciousness, Spirit, and Freedom can truly be attained.
On 39, Hegel explains “Truth is the Unity of the universal and subjective Will; and the Universal is to be found in the State, in its laws.” The Universal is the objective will, due to forming through the combination of multiple individual wills resulting in the majority (therefore subjective, hypothetically) will’s expression. True Freedom, Spirit, and self-consciousness are reached by following these laws because in doing so the individual is being true to itself and its personal passions and desires. These passions and desires expressed in the majority will are also supposedly the best, concerning Reason, Justice, and Liberty due to the human propensity, especially when acting as a society, towards the betterment of that society, i.e. towards the greater good.
This seems to be in stark contrast to everything discussed in the Eastern classics. The duty of the individual is transformed from one of self-purification to universal betterment, and simultaneously self-betterment. A shift from concentration on the soul in the afterlife to the soul in the present life is also seen. These differences, or apparent differences, raise two questions in my mind. First, can we see the disparities as results of utterly different eras and consequently different thought? Second, is the disparity really as great as it seems? Or, can we conclude that the explicit social benefits resulting from Hegel’s system were in fact, at least in part, implicit in one or all of the Eastern philosophies that we read?
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