But Will it Change your Mind?

But Will it Change your Mind?

So I can understand why we're reading this because Newman basically backs up every argument we've heard about why PLS is the best and we're the only ones who are going to save our souls and the business school is full of hedonistic ninny-muffins, but what effect can Newman have on someone who does not come into the reading with this impression? Basically, more broadly, I'm asking a question that has been touched upon before: to what extent does a reading of a work like this change people's minds or effect their opinions? Can it really? Or does it merely reinforce what they already believed to be true, and the rest just gets written off as invalid? Should we in PLS be more impressionable to these "great" texts?

Newman Today

Newman Today

Is Newman's idea of the university and liberal education? Or does his system not practically make sense in the our modern world?

Reasoned Faith

Reasoned Faith

In his discourse on Philosophical Knowledge Its Own End, Newman discusses faith. He denies the notion that faith is a "mere unreasoning act; on the contrary it has an intellectual nature." This view of faith as somehow based on reason is very different from other authors. How does it compare to other authors' opinions and is his argument convincing? What implications does this have for whether one can independently come to have faith?

PLS

PLS

I too would like to address the questions Rob raised concerning PLS. I would like to point to not only 7.10 but also 7.6, 7.8 and 7.9. Newman makes it clear why he believes a Liberal Education benefits society. Do we agree with his conclusions and justifications, and the ways he got there? Is there a problem with making knowledge or a "cultivated intellect" goods in themselves? If Miriam is right and he is making a parallel between or even equating God and knowledge, doesn't that present a heretical problem? ... I hate to simply rehash others' questions, especially on a topic that of course PLS kids would want to talk about, and so is almost cliche, or egotistical, but I think it's pretty important in our lives and in the text.

Catholicism and Physical Science

Catholicism and Physical Science

Newman writes that "as to Physical Science, of course there can be no real collision between it and Catholicism" (167,Discourse IX.3). But he then gives the example of Galileo and says that this was not in essence a clash between physics and Catholicism, but rather the fault of Galileo by going out of his way "directly to insult the received interpretation of Scripture." I think it is really important to understand the tension here of the implications of a Catholic University. Would the influence of Theology limit the possibilities and the scope of science and literature? Galileo is such a great example to analyze this tension because we have all read his work and are fairly familiar with the clash between him and the Catholic Church.

Justification for PLS?

Justification for PLS?

I have two questions, one of which Miriam already asked which is whether we agree that knowledge can be an end of itself. I am not sure that the parallels that he makes with medical knowledge and other areas of learning is a fair one. Other areas of learning have a more practical use (i.e. utility), but knowledge does not seem to have any practical application. Further, I wonder how we as PLS students feel about what Newman says in Discourse 7.10. To me, this section is the best (only?) justification of pursuing a PLS degree at ND. Do we agree that the heart of PLS (and what should be the goal of the entire University) is the training of good members of society?

Undigested Knowledge

Undigested Knowledge

Over the course of one's education, one finds different styles and methods that apply to them directly, and work for them personally. For my own life, there have been different ideas of learning that have indeed helped, and some that have hindered my learning process. In book six, entitled Knowledge Viewed in Relation to Learning, Newman discusses the concept of over educating...

"I will tell you Gentleman, what has been the practical error of the last twenty years--not to load the memory of the student with a mass of undigested knowledge, but to force upon him so much that he has rejected all. It has been the error of distracting and enfeebling the mind by an unmeaning profusion of subjects; of implying that a smattering in a dozen branches of study is not shallowness, which is really is, but enlargement, which is not; of considering an acquaintance with the learned names of things and persons, and the possession of clever duodecimos, and attendance on eloquent lecturers, and membership with scientific institutions, and the sight of the experiments of a platform and the specimens of a museum, that all this was not dissipation of mind, but progress. All things now are to learned at once, not first one thing, then another, not one well, but many badly. Learning is to be without exertion, without attention, without toil; without grounding, without advance, without finishing. There is to be nothing individual in it; and this, forsooth is the wonder of the age."

Im wondering what exactly Newman is talking about here. It seems to be quite a radical way to think about a style of educating one's self, is this a working method? The text alone should spark a discussion, but what exactly is Newman trying to get at?

God and Knowledge as ends

God and Knowledge as ends

I prematurely brought this up in class on Monday, so I'd like to restate my question now that it is more relevant. I mentioned how I think Newman defines God and knowledge in an identical way, that is, as ends in and of themselves that are good regardless of their utility. Their goodness is manifest in their works and in everything they create, but their worth and goodness are not defined by their products.

Is Newman really setting up a parallel here? And, if so, do we agree with him that knowledge is its own end?

Possessions and Knowledge as Liberal

Possessions and Knowledge as Liberal

On page 82, Newman quotes the great Philosopher and says that "of possessions, those rather are useful, which bear fruit; those liberal, which tend to enjoyment. By fruitful, I mean, which yield revenue; by enjoyable, where nothing accrues of consequence beyond the using". Meanwhile, when he discusses knowledge on page 84, he says that "Knowledge, I say, is then especially liberal, or sufficient for itself, apart from every external and ulterior object, when and so far as it is philosophical, and this I proceed to show".

It seems to me that true knowledge for Newman is theological knowledge, which would certainly "accrue something of consequence beyond the using". Essentially, I suppose that I am wondering how we can distinguish between Newman's ideas of possessions and knowledge and why liberal possessions seem to be somewhat different from liberal knowledge.

Theology as Knowledge

Theology as Knowledge

I end then as I began: religion doctrine is knowledge. This is the important truth, little entered into at this day, which I wish that all who have honoured me with their presence here would allow me to beg them to take away with them. I am not catching at sharp arguments, but laying down grave principles. Religious doctrine is knowledge, in as full a sense as Newton's doctrine is knowledge. University Teaching without Theology is simply unphilosophical. Theology has at least as good a right to claim a place there as Astronomy.

Newman justifies Theology as a course of study at the University because he believes that Theology leads to certain knowledge. He even goes so far to say that theological knowledge is as certain as scientific knowledge. I do not disagree with him regarding the place of theology at the University, but is he misconstruing the differences between scientific and theological knowledge? Scientific knowledge is empirical, and although he argues against sentimental theology, Newman opposes an empirical theology. Is he justified in equating scientific knowledge with theological knowledge? Or is it necessary to make a distinction?

Knowledge as an end in itself

Knowledge as an end in itself

Liberal Education, viewed in itself, is simply the cultivation of the intellect, as such, and its object is nothing more or less than intellectual excellence (92)

Newman stresses again and again that knowledge is an end in itself, and that the purpose of liberal education is to gain knowledge, and nothing more. He asserts that having a liberal education certainly doesn't make one a better person. Are you satisfied with this definition of a liberal education? I'm not necessarily rejecting his definition, but I wonder whether there is no useful or practical ends of a liberal education.

I'm also interested in talking about Newman's theological arguments. I'm surprised that he didn't defend a liberal education, including the study of theology, as ideal because it leads one on a proper path to salvation, or something to that effect.

Caitlin's Post

Caitlin's Post

I agree with Newman when he argues, “I do not see how it is possible for a philosophical mind, first, to believe these religious facts to be true; next, to consent to ignore them; and thirdly, in spite of this, to go on to profess to be teaching all the while de omni scibili” (20), but this comment makes me wonder: What would Newman have to say about the American system of higher education which is highly secular in character? Would he consider a secular university education an incomplete education?

Bridging the Gap?

Bridging the Gap?

With us Catholics, as with the first race of Protestants, as with Mahometans, and all Theists, the word [God] contains, as I have already said, a theology in itself.
--II.7

Newman describes the idea of theology concurrently being practiced in universities as one that considers religion a sentiment, or as something almost coincident with and revealed by natural science. He not-so-subtly suggests these Protestant universities' philosophical affiliation with atheism when he asks "how do you differ from Hume or Epicurus?" (II.8) Not only is the idea of God incompatible with this kind of university, but it seems Catholicism in particular is a requisite factor; for example, he reaches to the reliability of the Holy See to extricate himself from the trouble of impracticality (I.5). The linguistic chasm he describes above between "Theists" and Protestants seems intractable. He seems to be heading toward a description of universality which is only accessible for certain people.

Do you find his arguments satisfying? He relies on syllogism, and seems to have the Cartesian method of "of starting from fixed points, of making his ground good as he goes, of distinguishing what he knows from what he does not know" (Preface) in mind. At a few points he is keen to say that he is not engaging in sophism. It would not be surprising to discover that he begs the question in these arguments, that is, that he presumes a Catholic audience (which he specifically says that he does). This just goes back to that chasm in belief between him and the "Protestants." But what does that do to his method of argumentation? Why demonstrate to Catholics that theology is an essential part of knowledge if the very crux of the difference between Catholics and this other party that Catholics believe that theology is a matter of knowledge? Can this work mean anything to a non-Catholic, and if not, what does that mean for his method of argumentation?